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The Potential for Products Liability
Actions When Artificial Insemination by
an Anonymous Donor Produces Children
with Genetic Defects
I. Introduction
Although accounts of successful artificial insemination using the
semen of the recipient's husband date back to the late eighteenth
century,' inseminating women wi0h the semen of an anonymous donor
has only become a common practice in the past several decades.2 The
American legal system has recognized this trend in a variety of ways,
but the response has been neither uniform nor comprehensive. Many
states have enacted statutes modeled after the Uniform Parentage Act
of 1973' to define the relative parental rights and duties of the recipient
parents and the sperm donor,4 and several have explicitly delineated the
inheritance rights of children conceived through artificial insemination
1. The person credited with the first successful human artificial insemination was British
physician John Hunter, who advised a man who was suffering from hypospadias to fill a syringe
with his semen immediately following intercourse and inject it into his wife's vagina "while the
female organs were still under the influence of the coitus." DOUGLAS J. CUSINE, NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A LEGAL PERSPECrnVE 12, 13 (1988). The man complied, and
his wife became pregnant as a result While the date of this event is somewhat unclear, it appears
to have taken place between 1780 and 1799. Id. at 12. The earliest known mention of artificial
insemination as a means of conception can be found in the Babylonian Talmud, which tells of a
rabbi in the second century A.D. who suggested that a pregnant woman might still be worthy of
marrying a high priest if her pregnancy had resulted not from sexual intercourse, but from bathing
in water into which a man had ejaculated. See id. at 11.
2. See infra Part II.
3. "If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband,
a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived." UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 5(a) (1973).
4. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2451 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613
(West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-774 to 775 (1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-
5405 (1993); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2 (Michie 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1992);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West 1992); MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 46 § 4B (Law. Co-op. 1993);
MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.2824 (1993); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824
(Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (Michie
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:3(l) and B:11 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1993); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (Consol. 1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03, 14-18-04 (Michie 1993); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.37 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 552, 554, 555 (1993);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1993); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 12.03 (West 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 1992); Wis. STAT. § 891.40 (1992); WYo. STAT. 14-2-103 (1993).
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by donor ("AID").5 Still others have created legal obligations for AID
practitioners to test sperm donors for the I-EV virus prior to using their
semen.6 However, states have not yet adequately determined whether
any duty exists on the part of the physician, the sperm bank, or the
sperm donor to ensure that these children are born free of genetic
defects7 and diseases that could be passed to them through the donor's
semen. Thus far, Georgia is the only state that has enacted a law
expressly addressing physicians' liability for the results of artificial
insemination procedures, declaring that no liability will attach except in
cases of negligence.8
To date, no cases have been reported involving children who were
conceived through AID and later were born with genetic defects or
abnormalities.9 This may, however, convey a false sense of security
to potential recipients of donor semen. First, there have been several
instances in which sexually transmissible diseases, including the HIV
virus,10 have been contracted by women artificially inseminated with
5. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(c) (Michie 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-777
to 778 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-
06, 14-18-07 (Michie 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Michie 1993).
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2801(b) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-151(b)
(Harrison 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-3703 (Michie 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-14-5 (Bums
1993); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-334 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1008(1)
(1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(c) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.246 (Anderson
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 63, § 2151.1 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1-38 (1993); Wis.
STAT. § 146.025 (1993).
7. For purposes of this Comment, the term "genetic defect" will be used to refer to serious
medical conditions, such as hemophilia and Huntington's disease, which can be passed genetically
to one's offspring. The term is not intended to encompass genetically-linked traits, such as eye
color, which are not ordinarily associated with medical problems.
8. The relevant Georgia provision provides as follows:
Any physician or surgeon who obtains written authorization signed by both the husband
and the wife authorizing him to perform or administer artificial insemination shall be
relieved of civil liability to the husband and wife or to any child conceived ... for the
. . . results of said artificial insemination, provided that the written authorization
provided for in this Code section shall not relieve any physician or surgeon from any
civil liability arising from his own negligent administration or performance of artificial
insemination.
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42(b) (1993).
9. But see Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (involving a surrogate mother who
gave birth to a child with genetic defects caused by a venereal disease transmitted through the
known donor's sperm). Although Stiver does not raise many of the products liability issues
discussed in this Comment, it illustrates a potential for legal liability when artificial insemination
produces children with birth defects.
10. Responding to the AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) crisis, the American
Fertility Society and the American Association of Tissue Banks recommend that all semen
donations be frozen for at least six months prior to use since the HIV antibody may be
undetectable for up to three months. AMERICAN FERTILITY SocIETY, GUIDELINES FOR GAMETE
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donor semen." Second, many genetic disorders, such as Huntington's
disease, often do not appear until late in life, and therefore some AID
children may carry such traits and not yet be aware of them. Third,
statistics as to miscarriages and stillbirths are scarce. Accordingly,
genetic factors may have prevented some AID fetuses from even
achieving viability. Fourth, but most importantly, it is probably only a
matter of time before a genetically abnormal child is born as a result of
AID. The rate of genetic defects in naturally conceived live-born
children is approximately six to seven percent,' 2 and studies show that
most sperm banks and physicians do not screen donors adequately
enough to effectively reduce this percentage in children conceived
through AID.'3
The seemingly inevitable consequence of the deficient donor
screening process is the eventual birth of a genetically impaired child.
When this occurs, the child's mother 4 may very well sue any party
who had an opportunity to discover the defect in the semen and failed
to do so. This could include the physician who performed the
procedure, the sperm bank that distributed the semen, and the donor
himself. 5 Under the current state of the law, a products liability
DONATION: 1993 at 4S [hereinafter AFS GUIDELINES: 1993]; AMERICAN ASS'N OF TISSUE
BANKS, STANDARDS FOR TISSUE BANKING, Reproductive Council Addendum, CI.334 (1993)
[hereinafter AATB STANDARDS]. At least two states have codified this recommendation as well.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-14-7 (Bums 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.16273 (1992).
11. Laurene Mascola & Mary E. Guinan, Semen Donors as the Source of Sexually
Transmitted Diseases in Artificially Inseminated Women: The Saga Unfolds, 257 JAMA 1093
(1987) [hereinafter Mascola & Guinan, The Saga Unfolds]. Disease transmissions to the recipient
also increase the risks of spontaneous abortion, prematurity, stillbirth, and malformation, as well
as potentially infecting the fetus. Laurene Mascola & Mary E. Guinan, Screening to Reduce
Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Semen Used for Artificial Insemination, 314
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1354 (1986). Even though semen recipients have contracted HIV, no
fetuses conceived through artificial insemination have apparently been infected. G.J. Stewart et
al., Transmission of Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus Type I (HTLV 111) by Artificial
Insemination by Donor, ii LANCET 581 (1985) (stating that of eight women in Australia who were
inseminated with HIV-infected semen, four developed seropositivity for the virus but none of their
children were infected).
12. Terra Ziporyn, 'Artificial' Human Reproduction Poses Medical, Social Concerns, 255
JAMA 13 (1986).
13. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
14. For purposes of this Comment, all claims will be treated as those of the mother even
though these claims can theoretically be brought by both the birth mother of a child conceived
through artificial insemination and her husband (since the husband is treated as the legal father of
the child in most states, see supra note 4). This treatment merely simplifies the discussion and
recognizes that many recipients of donor semen are unmarried.
15. For a general discussion of the discoverability of donors' identities, see infra notes 33-34
and accompanying text.
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action has a substantial chance of success against any or all of these
classes of defendants.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the potential success of
a products liability claim, the consequences of allowing recovery in
such cases, and the need for proactive measures to settle some of these
issues before they ever arise or, ideally, to prevent them from arising at
all. Part II of this Comment will present an overview of the current
practice of AID in the United States. Part III will discuss the legal
theories on which a products liability claim could be based. Parts IV
and V will discuss the obstacles to establishing a plaintiffs prima facie
case and the defenses available to the various defendants. Finally, Part
VI will present recommendations for legal intervention in this area.
II. Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor
According to a 1960 survey by Britain's Feversham Committee,
doctors in the United States rarely performed AID prior to 1920, and as
of 1959, only eight physicians reported using the procedure.'"
Whether these statistics are attributable to physicians' reluctance to
provide AID services or their reluctance to admit that they did, the low
figure illustrates the negative light in which the practice was viewed. 7
By contrast, a 1987 survey revealed that from 1986 to 1987 roughly
11,000 physicians in the United States had performed artificial
inseminations on a total of nearly 172,000 women, resulting in 35,000
births from artificial insemination using the husband's semen and
30,000 births from AID.' 8
Even with the increasing numbers of AID procedures, the screening
of sperm donors has proven to be insufficient for various reasons. The
United States has not implemented a uniform set of laws with respect
to sperm donor screening. Two private groups, The American Fertility
Society (AFS) and The American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB),
16. Report of the Departmental Committee on Human Artificial Insemination, FEVERSHAM
COMMITTEE, app. 1, para. 4 (1960).
17. As recently as 1981, artificial insemination with donor semen was illegal in Indiana,
Minnesota, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin. R. SNOwDEN & G.D. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL
FAMILY: A CONSIDERATION OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR 19 (1981) (providing a
general discussion of society's negative perceptions of artificial insemination by donor a little more
than a decade ago).
18. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICES (1988) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. Although artificial insemination success rates
vary from one practitioner to the next, an average of nearly 75% of patients eventually become
pregnant, most of them by the sixth cycle of inseminations. Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass,
Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 623, 655 (1991).
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have published recommended standards, 9  but compliance is
completely voluntary. In many institutions, sperm donor screening is
grossly inadequate.2" For example, in a 1987 survey, 26% of
responding AID practitioners stated that they would accept semen from
a donor with a family history of Huntington's disease, a condition with
a 50% chance of appearing in that donor's offspring.2' In a similar
study conducted in 1979, 94.7% of physicians polled stated that they
would reject a donor who carried Tay-Sachs disease, yet less than 1%
of the physicians tested donors for that disease. 2 Only 28.8% of the
physicians in the latter study performed any biochemical testing on
donors beyond blood tests, the rest of them relying heavily on the
donors' candor in filling out medical history questionnaires.23
However, many sperm donors are paid only if their semen is deemed
acceptable for use in inseminations, creating a monetary incentive to
withhold information on these questionnaires.24 Furthermore, even if
a donor is completely forthright with his answers, he may still be
carrying a defect or disease of which he is unaware. While the majority
of sperm donors are medical students, 5 studies have shown that as a
19. Copies of the AATB STANDARDS and the Reproductive Council Addendum, supra note
10, can be obtained by writing to the AATB at 1350 Beverly Road, Suite 220-A, McLean, VA
22101. Copies of the AFS GUIDELINES: 1993, supra note 10, are available from the American
Fertility Society at 1209 Montgomery Highway, Birmingham, AL 35216-2809.
20. Mostly it is the smaller sperm banks that are neglecting to follow recommended
procedures. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 141, Table 8.1.
21. See OTA REPORT, supra note 18.
22. Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the
United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585, 588 (1979). Tay-Sachs disease, most commonly found
in children of Eastern European Jewish parents, is a painful condition in which children appear
normal at birth but begin to rapidly deteriorate after only a few months, in most cases dying by
the age of three. See Curt S. Rush, Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe v. Wade:
How Viable is Roe's Viability Standard?, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 113, 115 n.1l (1983). The children
suffer a great deal during their short lives. "During the degenerative period, they develop a
hypersensitivity to sound, so that even small noises will evoke violent reactions, and they
frequently give the impression of suffering both physical pain and fear as they develop blindness
and paralysis and lose mental contact with their environment." Id. (quoting Macintyre, Genetic
Risk, Prenatal Diagnosis, and Selective Abortion, ABORTION, SociETY AND THE LAw 223 (Walbert
& Butler eds., 1973)).
23. Curie-Cohen et al., supra note 22, at 588.
24. By analogy, blood donors who receive payment tend to be less honest on their medical
questionnaires than unpaid volunteers. Id.
25. The majority of doctors (62%) obtain semen exclusively from medical students and
hospital residents. See Curie-Cohen et al., supra note 22, at 586. Other common sources include
university and non-medical graduate students, military cadets, husbands of obstetric patients,
hospital personnel, and friends of practitioners. Id.
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1994
group they have proven to be only slightly more accurate in identifying
their own genetic risk factors than donors with no medical training.26
Given these faults in the sperm donor screening process used by
many practitioners, it is amazing that there have not yet been any
reported instances in which children conceived through AID have been
born with serious genetic defects. Absent drastic change, however, that
unfortunate day is sure to come. When it does, the courts are certain
to hear about it.
III. Theories Under Which Products Liability Claims May Be
Brought
A. Negligence
Under certain circumstances, the mother of a child who has
inherited a genetic defect from a sperm donor is likely to prevail in a
products liability action against the artificial insemination practitioner,
the sperm bank, or the donor under a negligence theory. This approach
is most likely to succeed when the defendant knew or should have
known that the donated semen carried a genetic abnormality. For
instance, if a sperm donor knew that he has a familial history of sickle-
cell anemia or if he could find out upon reasonable inquiry that he does,
and yet he failed to mention it when filling out his donor questionnaire,
a court would likely find him liable for the foreseeable consequences of
his negligent nondisclosure.27 Furthermore, if the AID practitioner
failed to detect the disease or to warn the recipient that it might exist,
he would likely be held liable for negligent breach of his professional
duties if (1) it was foreseeable that the donor would carry such a
condition, and (2) a reasonable practitioner would have detected the
condition or given warnings to the recipient.28
1. Liability of the Sperm Donor.-Suppliers of products can be
held liable for negligence in the sale or manufacture of the product or
26. In a study of AID screening practices, 90% of sperm donors with non-medical
backgrounds failed to identify genetic disorders in their familial histories. M. Chrystie Timmons
et al., Genetic Screening of Donors for Artificial Insemination, 35 FERTILITY & STERILITY 451,
453, 455 (1981). Donors in the medical field did somewhat better, but still missed over two-thirds
of the disorders in their families. Id.
27. Conversely, if a donor has no notice, either actual or constructive, of the potential
presence of a defect, he would not be negligent in failing to disclose it. See Hubbell v. South
Nassau Communities Hosp., 260 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540-41 (1965) (holding blood donor free from
liability where he had no reason to know his blood was contaminated with serum hepatitis).
28. See infra Part III(A)(2).
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for a failure to provide adequate warnings as to the product's
dangers.29  A sperm donor might be negligent in "selling"3 ° semen
which he reasonable should know to be unfit for use in inseminations
due to some genetic defect or transmissible disease. Also, he might be
negligent in failing to warn the practitioner to whom he delivers the
semen about all known or reasonably knowable defects in his semen.
Since privity is no longer a prerequisite to products liability claims
sounding in negligence, 3' the donor could conceivably be held liable
to the semen recipient for either type of negligent conduct, even though
he may have had no direct contact with her. Therefore, since a sperm
donor knows that his semen will be used by someone other than the
person to whom he delivers it and because the donor's negligence in
failing to reasonably identify his genetic risk factors could cause
foreseeable harm to that person, he may be liable for his negligence
without privity.32
Sperm donors generally remain anonymous to the birth parents in
AID, a fact which may present obstacles to recovery from the donor in
some instances. However, in several states a donor's identity can be
disclosed upon a showing of good cause.33 Evidence that a sperm
donor may have intentionally or negligently withheld pertinent medical
information may be sufficient to persuade a judge to require that his
identity be made known, not only to make him amenable to suit, but
29. See generally W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 96 (5th ed.
1984).
30. For a discussion of whether a semen donation constitutes a "sale," see infra Part III(B)(2).
31. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Il1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
32. See id.
33. The sperm donor consent form used by the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology of
the University of Washington School of Medicine, reprinted in the 1990 edition of AFS
GUIDELINES, states: "I understand that my... identity will be kept in strictest confidence unless
a court orders disclosure for good cause shown pursuant to state law (RCW 26.26.050)."
AMERICAN FERTILITY SOCIETY, NEW GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF SEMEN DONOR INSEMINATON:
1990 at 12S [hereinafter 1990 AFS GUIDELINES]. Several other states statutorily provide for
disclosure of a sperm donor's identity upon a showing of good cause, as well. See ALA. CODE
§ 26-17-21(a) (1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-106
(1993); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (Michie 1993); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (1993); MO. REV.
STAT. § 210.824 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061
(Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1993); Wis. STAT. § 891.40 (1992); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-2-103(a) (1992). Disclosure for good cause is also used with respect to discovering
the identities of an adoptee's biological parents in states with "closed" adoption statutes. See
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162(1)(d) (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-52(a) (West 1992); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 114 (McKinney 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
1780(B) (Law. Co-op. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-236 (Michie 1993).
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also to enable the birth parents to gain a fuller understanding of the
nature of their child's genetic condition.34
2. Liability of the Artificial Insemination Practitioner.-A
physician or sperm bank could be held liable for negligently failing to
properly screen donors35 or to warn recipients of any foreseeable risks
inherent in insemination with an anonymous donor's semen. 6 More
specifically, if a physician relies blindly upon what a donor has
voluntarily disclosed about his medical history without taking any tests
or checking any medical records,37 the physician has probably
breached a duty of care to that patient and should be held liable in
negligence. This result is especially desirable when one considers that
the recipient patient, having no reasonable means or opportunity to
inspect the semen for defects herself, must rely on the practitioner's
professional judgment that the semen is acceptable for use in
inseminations. Largely for this reason, one court has found artificial
insemination practitioners in the context of surrogacy contracts to owe
a special duty of care - an affirmative duty of protection - to the
woman being inseminated and her resulting child.38
As a defense, physicians might assert that their actions comported
with the prevailing medical practice, and therefore, that they satisfied
the required duty of care.39 The applicable standard of care in the
34. In deciding what constitutes good cause, courts must weigh the interests of all parties
involved. See generally Golan v. Louise Wise Serv., 507 N.E.2d 275, 277 (N.Y. 1987). For
disclosure to be warranted in the adoption context, for example, the adoptee must prove that her
need to discover the information outweighs the biological parents' interest in protecting their
privacy, the adoptive parents' interest in freedom from interference by the biological parents, and
society's interest in maintaining the integrity of its adoption process by avoiding unnecessary
breaches of confidence. Id. The child's need for medical diagnosis and treatment is likely to be
sufficient to override the competing interests in the artificial insemination context, just as it has
in adoption cases. Cf Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs of Stark County, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1103
(Ohio 1986) (allowing the opening of adoption records to facilitate medical treatment of child with
Huntington's Disease).
35. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding persons who performed
artificial insemination in the context of a surrogacy contract liable for negligent donor screening).
In an analogous context, blood banks have been held liable for negligently failing to detect
contaminants in donated blood through donor screening. See, e.g., Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs.,
506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting Louisiana state law); Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa
Medical Ass'n Blood Bank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Ct. App. 1976).
36. See, e.g., Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Or. 1963) (holding
manufacturer of pesticide liable for failure to wam consumer of inherent dangers in product which
were foreseeable to the manufacturer but not to the ordinary consumer).
37. Unfortunately, this appears to be a prevalent practice in the United States. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.
38. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 272 (6th Cir. 1992).
39. Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 517 (Ct. App. 1993) (accepting
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medical field, established by expert testimony, is that to which a
reasonably prudent medical professional in the same field would adhere
in the same or similar circumstances. 4 It is possible, however, that
the entire profession may be acting unreasonably and that mere
compliance with common practice is not enough.4' This may be the
case with the screening of sperm donors. With complex genetic testing
procedures currently available,42 mere reliance on donor questionnaires
is an unreasonable and inadequate screening method. Of course, many
genetic conditions exist which are so rare and difficult or expensive to
detect that requiring physicians to perform such tests would be
thoroughly impracticable.43 In the alternative, when a condition is
common and relatively inexpensive to detect or when a donor is a
member of a particularly high-risk group,44 failure to conduct such
tests may properly be viewed as negligence. Although additional
testing would raise the costs of artificial insemination, most prospective
recipients would be willing to pay for the increased likelihood, albeit
not certainty, of giving birth to a normal, healthy child.4
Ideally, rather than leaving it to physicians to weigh the costs and
benefits of testing for each and every conceivable genetic disorder,
mandatory national standards should be drawn up to guide them.46
the defendant's argument that failure to perform a particular AIDS test on donated blood was not
negligent when no other blood bank in the country was using the test at that time); see also
Osbom v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (CL App. 1992).
40. See Strain v. Ferroni, 592 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. Super. CL 1991); Douglas v. United States,
626 F. Supp. 86, 90 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Plutshack v. University of Minnesota Hosps., 316 N.W.2d
1, 5 n.7 (Minn. 1982); Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 392-93 (Cal. 1976).
41. See Promen v. Ward, 591 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio CL App. 1990) (finding that compliance
with customary practice alone was not conclusive as to the defendant's non-negligence).
42. See generally GENETIC SCREENING: FROM NEWBORNS TO DNA TYPING (Bartha Maria
Knoppers & Claude M. Laberge eds., 1990).
43. Biochemical testing, while inexpensive, is capable of detecting less than 100 of the nearly
2,000 medically recognized genetic defects. Beyond taking familial medical histories, the only
way to detect many genetic disorders is through karyotyping, a relatively costly and at times
imprecise procedure. See generally Ellen E. Wright, Note, Father and Mother Know Best:
Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1490-
94 n.16 (1978) [hereinafter Genetic Counseling].
44. In particular, four ethnically linked disorders exist for which reliable testing methods are
available - infantile Tay-Sachs disease among Ashkenazi Jews, juvenile Tay-Sachs disease among
the Lebanese, sickle-cell anemia among persons of African descent, and thalassemia among
Mediterranean peoples. William G. Johnson, M.D., et al., Artificial Insemination by Donors: The
Need for Genetic Screening, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 755, 756 (1981).
45. See Ziporyn, supra note 12, at 14.
46. From a plaintiff's perspective, the need for standards becomes especially clear in light
of two recent California state court decisions in which a blood bank was held not negligent in
limiting its donor screening practices to a certain series of questions when there were no published
standards detailing the types of questions that should be asked of prospective blood donors with
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Not only would this enable doctors to determine with some certainty
what actions they should take to protect themselves from liability for
negligence, but such standards would also reduce the probability of
children being born with birth defects.
B. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
1. UC.C. "Goods" Requirement.-The Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) imposes an implied warranty of merchantability upon all
sales of goods by merchants.47 This warranty requires that the goods
be fit for the ordinary purpose for which they are intended, but stops
short of requiring absolute perfection.48 In trying to imply that such
warranties exist with respect to artificial insemination, the most obvious
question to be answered is whether or not the transfer of semen from
the donor to the recipient, through the various intermediaries, can be
categorized as a sale within the purview of the U.C.C. The U.C.C. does
not apply to the rendering of services, but only to the sale of goods.49
However, the goods versus services distinction is sometimes hard to
draw, especially when a contract calls for the use of products during the
performance of a service.5"
(a) The goods versus services distinction in the context of
blood.-To determine how to classify artificial insemination, it is
helpful to look at an analogous type of transaction, the blood
transfusion. Under the common law, many courts held medical
personnel liable for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
when contaminated blood was introduced into a patient's body."' This
regard to their likelihood of being infected with the HIV virus. Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood
Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 517 (Ct. App. 1993); Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr.
2d 101, 123, 128-29 (Ct App. 1992).
47. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1993).
48. Id. § 2-314(2).
49. Id. § 2-102 (1993).
50. See, e.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's, 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969) (discussing the existence of
an implied warranty in a hybrid sale/service transaction involving the application of a permanent
wave solution by a beautician).
51. See Hekeler v. St. Margaret Memorial Hosp., 74 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (1976); Rostocki v.
Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
1967). Several courts have similarly held blood transfusions to constitute sales for purposes of
strict products liability. See, e.g., Weber v. Charity Hosp., 487 So. 2d 148 (La. 1986);
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (11. 1970). Many courts appear willing
to hold a commercial entity such as a blood bank liable for breach of warranty while refusing to
subject hospitals to the same liability. See, e.g., Carter v. Interfaith Hosp. of Queens, 304
N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (dismissing warranty claim against hospital but upholding claim
against blood bank).
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rule of liability applied even when the defect in the blood was
undiscoverable, because in the warranty context the quality of a product
was the sole determinant of whether there had been a breach, and any
precautions taken by the seller were irrelevant.52
Other courts have characterized blood transfusions as services such
that no warranties attach 3.5  Among this line of cases is Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital4 in which the court refused to define blood as a
product, largely because imposing liability on medical personnel for
undetectable defects would make them virtual insurers of the purity of
donated blood.55  Undoubtedly, imposing liability on medical
personnel would cause medical malpractice insurance rates to rise,
making some physicians unwilling to perform blood transfusions at all.
To ensure the continued availability of blood transfusions, an extremely
beneficial medical procedure, those courts following the Perlmutter
rationale have declined to impose warranty liability in that context.56
As the concern over liability for supplying contaminated blood has
grown during the recent AIDS crisis, many states have statutorily
adopted the Perlmutter approach. These so-called "blood shield
statutes" expressly provide that the supply of blood for transfusions is
a medical service and not a sale, thus removing this type of transaction
from the U.C.C. umbrella."
52. See, e.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward, 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that the
delivery of diseased animals pursuant to a sales contract constituted a breach of warranty even
though the disease was undetectable by the seller); City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640
F. Supp. 559, 565 (D. S.C. 1986).
53. See Jennings v. Roosevelt Hosp., 372 N.Y.S.2d 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (hospital);
Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965)
(blood bank); Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D.C. Colo. 1964) (hospital);
Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Ctr., Inc., 127 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1964) (blood bank); Dibblee v. Dr.
W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961) (hospital).
54. 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
55. Id. at 795.
56. See supra note 53 and cases cited therein.
57. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1993);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-104(2) (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-280 (West 1992); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 672.316(5)-(6) (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2-316(5), 51-1-28(a) (1993); IDAHO
CODE § 39-3702 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-12-11(a) (Bums 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 139.125 (Michie 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797 (West 1992); MtSS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
1 (1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (Vernon 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.010 (Michie
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (Michie 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (1993); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 23-17-30 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-31-1 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-23-
1 (1993).
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(b) The goods versus services distinction as applied to AID.-As
for artificial insemination by donor, the question regarding whether or
not courts would consider semen to be "goods" remains open.
Although many blood shield statutes are not restricted to blood alone,
none specifically mentions semen as being within its contemplation.
Arguably, semen could be included in the catch-all phrase "human
tissue" which many such statutes contain,5" but none of the acts'
legislative histories indicates that such an inclusion was intended.
Further, the underlying intent behind most blood shield statutes was to
ensure that the blood supply did not suffer due to donors' fears of being
held accountable if their blood proved to be contaminated.59 This
policy decision was made in view of the essential role that donated
blood plays in our health care system. 60  Donor semen, by contrast,
does not enjoy a comparable status in our society. Although it may be
deemed essential by those persons for whom other methods of
conception are impracticable, unavailability of donor semen would not
create a national crisis as would occur with a depletion of our blood
supply. Artificial insemination is therefore distinguishable from blood
transfusions, and it cannot be assumed that setnen will be afforded
protection under the ambit of blood shield statutes in their current
forms.
2. UC.C. Sale by Merchant Requirement.-While there appears
to be a substantial possibility that the semen provided in artificial
58. The language of the Illinois blood shield legislation is typical of this type of statute:
The procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing or using human whole
blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives and products, comeas, bones, or
organs or other human tissue for the purpose of injecting, transfusing or transplanting
any of them in the human body is declared for purposes of liability in tort or contract
to be the rendition of a service by every person, firm or corporation participating
therein, whether or not any remuneration is paid therefor, and is declared not to be a
sale of any such items and no warranties of any kind ... nor strict tort liability shall
be applicable thereto ....
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2 (Michie 1993).
59. See, e.g., McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447
(Ct. App. 1976) (stating that the purpose of California's statute was to promote the constant
availability of an adequate blood supply). The historical notes accompanying the Idaho blood
shield statute contain an explicit statement of legislative intent: "[With] the availability of...
blood products .. .being important to the health and welfare of the people of the state of Idaho,
it is ... the public policy of the state that the health and welfare ... will be promoted by limiting
the legal liability arising out of ... blood services ...." IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1993) (quoting
1987 Idaho Sess. Laws § 1, ch. 148).
60. See, e.g., Hill v. Jackson Park Hosp., 349 N.E.2d 541 (I11. App. Ct. 1976) (finding that
the legislature had decided to treat blood differently from other articles because of the special and
indispensable place that blood occupies in the practice of medicine).
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insemination may be deemed to be "goods" under the U.C.C., this alone
does not create an implied warranty. It also must be determined that a
sale has occurred and that the seller is a merchant. 6' The U.C.C.
defines a sale as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price. "62 When a donor delivers his semen to a sperm bank or
hospital, he is usually paid for his donation.63 Thus, assuming
arguendo that it is possible to obtain "title" in semen, this exchange
surely fits the definition of a "sale." If a sperm bank is involved, it
then transfers the semen to the artificial insemination practitioner in
exchange for payment. The recipient, in turn, pays the practitioner an
average of $953.00 per insemination. 64  Each of these transactions
might also qualify as a sale, although it is arguable that the insemination
itself is not a sale if the recipient is not billed separately for the
semen.
65
The sperm bank and practitioner would also fit the U.C.C.
definition of "merchant" since both "hold themselves out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved. ' 66 The
donor, on the other hand, most likely would not be considered to be a
merchant unless he donates his semen frequently, in which case a
plaintiff might assert that he "deals in goods of the kind." 7
3. Problems with Treating Sperm as a Commodity.-A potentially
difficult issue which might arise in the warranty context is that the sale
of sperm conjures up images of baby selling, an illegal practice in every
61. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1993).
62. U.C.C. § 2.106(l) (1993).
63. Curie-Cohen et al., supra note 22, at 587.
64. OTA REPORT, supra note 18.
65. See Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965)
(holding that a blood bank was not a seller of blood because the recipient was not charged
separately for the blood); see also Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Ctr., 127 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Wis.
1964).
66. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1993).
67. Id. Whether or not a party is a merchant "is of necessity highly dependent on the factual
setting of the transaction in question." Ferragamo v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 481 N.E.2d
477, 480 (Mass. 1985) (quoting I R.A. ANDERSON, U.C.C. § 2-104:25 (3d ed. 1981)). See also
Touch of Class Leasing v. Mercedes-Benz Credit of Canada, 591 A.2d 661, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1991). Some courts have found non-professional sellers to be merchants if they engage in a
regular pattern of sales. See, e.g., Colorado-Kansas Grain Co. v. Reifschneider, 817 P.2d 637
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991). The more prevalent rule, however, is that a seller is not a merchant unless
he has more specialized knowledge with regard to the product than the ultimate consumer. See,
e.g., Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1983). Under this approach, most sperm donors
would not be considered merchants.
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state.68 In re Matter of Baby AP9 involved a surrogacy contract
providing that a "surrogate" mother who was to be artificially
inseminated with another man's sperm be paid for carrying the resulting
child after she relinquished the child to the sperm donor after its birth.
The New Jersey Supreme Court declared this contract to be violative of
a state statute prohibiting the payment of money for private
adoptions70 and further suggested that such contracts may even be
criminal.7' This decision hinged, in part, on the fact that the surrogate
mother would receive $10,000 if the child was born and delivered to the
"adoptive" parents, only $1,000 if the child was stillborn, and nothing
if the fetus died during the first trimester of her pregnancy.72 Under
these facts, the surrogate was found to be receiving payment for the
child itself, not for her expenses or services in carrying and delivering
it since those costs would have been the same whether or not the child
had been born healthy.73
Artificial insemination obviously differs from surrogacy in that
payment is made not for a child and not for a fetus, but merely for
semen which has not yet and may never successfully fertilize an egg.
In that sense, sperm donation cannot truly be considered baby selling.
Sperm donations in exchange for the payment of money may, however,
be sufficiently similar to baby selling to warrant being declared contrary
to public policy; the process also tends to treat children as
commodities.74 The result of such analysis is a "catch-22" situation
for plaintiffs. To recover under a warranty theory requires proving that
the insemination was a sale, but in so doing, a plaintiff exposes herself
to the possibility that courts will refuse to grant relief because the sale
violated public policy. In addition, the plaintiff could theoretically end
up as the target of a criminal prosecution.
Overall, the implied warranty of merchantability offers a plausible
theory under which plaintiffs may recover damages for genetic defects
resulting from artificial insemination. It is fraught with obstacles,
68. See William L. Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11
FAM. L. REP. 3001 (1985).
69. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
70. Id. at 1240-42.
71. Id. at 1234.
72. Id. at 1241.
73. Id.
74. The American Fertility Society appears to have foreseen the possibility of legal and/or
ethical problems with paying donors for their semen. The guidelines promulgated by that
association provide that "[p]ayment to donors will vary from area to area but should not be such
that the monetary incentive is the primary factor in donating sperm. However, the donor should
be compensated for his time and expenses." AFS GUIDELINES: 1993, supra note 10, at 4S.
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however, and predicting how a court might come out on such a claim
would be sheer speculation given the law in its current state.
C. Strict Liability in Tort
Parents of a genetically impaired child conceived through artificial
insemination by donor may also seek recovery under a strict products
liability theory in tort. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
allows recovery for physical harm from a merchant who sells a product
"in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer."75 Privity between the defendant and the plaintiff consumer
does not have to be established for liability to attach.76 Accordingly,
under this approach, a semen recipient could recover from anyone along
the supply chain who was "in the business of selling""' the semen. As
in negligence, strict liability can attach for the manufacture and sale of
the product, as well as for-failure to warn of knowable defects.7"
Obviously, this theory involves some of the same questions
discussed with regard to the warranty theory, namely, whether semen
is a "product"79 and whether artificial insemination constitutes a
"sale."8  Strict liability gives rise to additional issues as well.
Specifically, strict liability requires an analysis of when semen is
considered "defective" and when such a defect renders it "unreasonably
dangerous."
1. Tests for Product Defect.-Two tests have been developed to
determine whether a product is defective under § 402A. The first, a
consumer expectation of safety test, looks to the level of safety a
prudent consumer would anticipate for a reasonably foreseeable use of
the product.8 ' In the case of artificial insemination, reasonable
recipients of donor semen would probably expect that the semen has
been screened and found to be free of sexually transmissible diseases
and obvious genetic defects. However, a reasonable person would most
likely also recognize that no amount of testing can guarantee that a
child will be born perfect. As with conception through sexual
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(I) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
76. See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
77. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 402A(l)(a).
78. See, e.g., Ross Lab. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986); Collins v. Sunnyside Corp.,
496 N.E.2d 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
79. See supra Part Ill(B)(1).
80. See supra Part III(B)(2).
81. See, e.g., Keogh v. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991); Baughn v. Honda Motor
Co., 727 P.2d 655 (Wash. 1986).
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intercourse, mutations are bound to occur on occasion, and scientists
cannot predict with accuracy what will happen when two individuals'
gene pools are combined. 2 Under the consumer expectation of safety
standard, then, semen probably will be considered "defective" only
when the abnormality is reasonably foreseeable and readily detectable.
The second test for defectiveness involves a risk-utility balance in
which a product's inherent dangers are weighed against its societal
benefits. 3 Here, a defendant would likely assert that the benefits of
making donor semen available for use in artificial insemination
outweigh the inherent risks of genetic defects. In support of this
position, a defendant would assert that (1) the number of normal
children born through AID greatly exceeds the number born with
genetic deficiencies, and (2) imposition of strict liability would drive
many sperm banks and practitioners out of business by making them
virtual insurers of a child's health. Blood banks successfully made
similar arguments in several states prior to the passage of blood shield
statutes, 84 but as discussed earlier, donor sperm may not be deemed to
have as much social utility as donor blood.85 Also, the social utility
argument is weakened by the fact that many AID practitioners are not
taking adequate precautions to minimize the risks associated with the
procedure. 6  It is difficult to predict how a court would resolve a
balancing test in these circumstances. However, lawmakers' actions in
passing blood shield statutes and their inaction in addressing artificial
insemination might suggest to courts that lawmakers consider artificial
insemination by an anonymous donor to have less social utility than
blood transfusions. Such a determination may tip the scales in favor of
the sperm recipient, reinforcing the argument that semen should be
considered a defective product under the risk-utility test.
2. Unreasonable Danger Requirement.-Even if a product defect
is proven, it usually must be shown to have been unreasonably
82. See generally EDWARD NOVITSKI, HUMAN GENETICS (2d ed. 1982).
83. See Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991);
Haran v. Union Carbide Co., 497 N.E.2d 678 (N.Y. 1986); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986); Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835
(Iowa 1978). But see Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Co., 596 A.2d 845 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that the risk-utility balance is not to be used in Pennsylvania cases
involving § 402A).
84. Most blood shield statutes protect blood suppliers from strict liability as well as from the
imposition of implied warranties. See supra note 57.
85. See supra Part lII(B)(1)(b).
86. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
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dangerous in order for strict liability to be imposed. 7 Some courts,
however, have found that the unreasonable danger requirement of §
402A is too similar to a negligence standard, which has no place in
strict liability, and have refused to require anything beyond
defectiveness.8 Of those states that recognize the unreasonable danger
requirement, most follow the definition in Comment i of the
Restatement 9 which establishes that, "the article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." 90
In some cases, practitioners attempt to guard against a finding of
an "unreasonably dangerous" product by informing the recipient of the
dangers involved in AID. In so doing, many artificial insemination
practitioners require their patients to sign consent forms stating that they
understand that the occurrence of a certain percentage of physical and
mental defects is beyond the practitioner's control. 9' Arguably, after
signing such a consent form, a recipient may appear to have notice that
some dangers exist. However, it is not necessarily true that the degree
of danger would be obvious to the recipient, as she might reasonable
expect more thorough donor screening than is actually performed.92
Thus, even if a recipient is aware of the general risks of AID due to a
consent form, donor semen is likely to meet the unreasonable danger
requirement of Comment i.
3. Semen as an Unavoidably Unsafe Product.-A plaintiff seeking
recovery for strict products liability will also run into the obstacle
created by Comment k to § 402A, dealing with unavoidably unsafe
products. Comment k states the following:
87. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 402A(l). But see Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 105
Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (Ct. App. 1973) (holding that negligence and strict liability claims merge);
Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973).
88. See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978); Bradford v. Bendiz-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
89. See, e.g., Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1977) (federal court
predicting that a Utah state court would follow Comment i); Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505
(Vt. 1977); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
90. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 402A cmt. i.
91. Sample recipient consent forms, courtesy of the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology
and Infertility at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center, can be found in the 1990 AFS
GUIDELINES, supra note 33.
92. See infra Part V(A).
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There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. ... The seller of such products ... is not to be
held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.93
In the context of blood transfusions, prior to the enactment of
blood shield statutes courts were split as to whether contaminated blood
constituted an "unavoidably unsafe product." Some held that blood was
"unavoidably unsafe" because the contamination was not discoverable
with the technology at the time, because the benefits of a strong blood
supply greatly outweighed the dangers of contaminating some donees,
and because these benefits were not achievable by any other means.94
It is difficult to predict whether or not a court using this analysis would
categorize donor semen as "unavoidably unsafe." Any decision would
necessarily depend upon the level of social utility accorded to artificial
insemination as compared to blood transfusions, an issue which has
never been addressed by the courts.
Other courts have declared that contaminated blood is not
"unavoidably unsafe." For example, the court in Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hosp. 9 5 held that Comment k does not apply to
impure products, such as contaminated- blood, but only to pure products
that carry inherent risks, such as the Pasteur rabies vaccine.9 6 Semen
would fall into the latter category of products since a genetic defect is
not the result of some outside force contaminating the semen, but rather
is inherent in cells which are still in their pure, natural state. Under this
approach, then, Comment k might apply to donor semen. However,
before such a determination can be made, one must find that the danger
of a genetic defect is unavoidable. If accurate methods of discovering
the defect are available, the danger of its being transmitted is clearly
avoidable, and Comment k would not protect the AID practitioner from
liability. Absent a technologically feasible means of detecting the
defect, though, a court might be persuaded to categorize the semen as
an unavoidably unsafe product, especially if it feels that artificial
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 402A cmt. k.
94. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983);
McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 332 A.2d
596 (N.J. 1975); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 527 P.2d 1075 (N.M. 1974).
95. 266 N.E.2d 897 (III. 1970).
96. Id. at 903-04.
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insemination has high social utility similar to blood transfusions. In that
case, after a finding that semen is an "unavoidably unsafe product," a
plaintiff would be unable to recover if she was adequately warned of
the dangers.97
IV. Obstacles to Making Out a Prima Facie Case
Although all three products liability theories are to some extent
applicable in the artificial insemination context, proving a prima facie
case might be difficult for several reasons. First, in the uncertain area
of genetics, a plaintiff may have difficulty proving that a particular
defect was caused by the sperm donor's genes. In addition, while most
states would permit a cause of action to be brought by the mother of a
child born with a genetic defect, many would find that the child lacks
standing to assert a claim for injuries.
A. Difficulties in Establishing Causation
To make out a claim against the sperm donor under any theory of
liability, a plaintiff must be able to show a direct causal link between
the donor's semen and the child's condition.98 This could be quite
difficult to establish with any degree of certainty. The majority of
genetic and nongenetic birth defects occur as the result of spontaneous
mutations such that causation cannot be attributed to either biological
parent.99 Also, birth defects are often caused by nongenetic factors,
such as toxic exposure, smoking, alcohol consumption, and drug use by
the mother during her pregnancy."'0 Finally, it is always possible that
a defect exists in the genes of the recipient mother. Thus, it may be
difficult to show that the donor's semen was a cause-in-fact, let alone
a legal cause, of the child's condition.
97. Although all members of the supply chain have a duty to warn of unavoidably unsafe
characteristics of the products, the "learned intermediary" doctrine might excuse a sperm bank
from liability if it adequately warns the AID practitioner, a professional intermediary, of the
dangers inherent in donor semen. See Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987),
reh'g denied, 812 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding drug manufacturer's warning to physicians
was adequate and did not require the manufacturer to provide warnings to consumer). But see
Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (D. Mich. 1985) (finding that the
manufacturer's duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the dangers of oral contraceptive use was
not discharged by warnings given to physician intermediaries).
98. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 41.
99. Colin D. Matthews, M.D., et al., Screening of Karyotype and Semen Quality in an
Artificial Insemination Program: Acceptance and Rejection Criteria, 40 FERTILITY & STERILITY
648, 653 (1983).
100. See generally David F. Chavkin, "For Their Own Good": Civil Commitment of Alcohol
and Drug Dependent Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. REV. 224 (1992).
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1994
Causation presents less of a problem with respect to AID
practitioners, since they might be held liable even if the donor's semen
did not cause the birth defect. For example, an AID practitioner might
be found liable for failing to warn a recipient of the possibility that her
own genes might be defective or that a spontaneous birth defect might
arise.' °' However, given the current practice of inadequate donor
screening, plaintiffs will frequently allege that the birth defect arose due
to the practitioner's failure to detect a genetic defect in the donor's
semen. In such cases, she must be prepared to show a causal
connection between the semen and the child's condition.
B. Establishing Standing to State a Claim
1. The Child as Plaintiff.-It is well established that children can
recover for torts committed against them during the time between
conception and birth,"0 2 but some courts are reluctant to allow
recovery for preconception torts.0 3  On the other hand, those
decisions that rejected claims based on preconception conduct have not
involved conduct that was aimed specifically at achieving the
conception itself.'0 4  Even though a physician who negligently
performs an abortion has been held not to owe any duty to any
subsequent children the patient may conceive,"0 5 it is hard to accept
that an artificial insemination practitioner, sperm bank, and sperm donor
owe no duty of care whatsoever to the child whose conception they are
actively seeking. Unlike the reported preconception cases, the child
resulting from an AID procedure is a foreseeable plaintiff. Therefore,
because of the nature of artificial insemination, courts might be inclined
to find a duty to the unconceived child and thus might theoretically
entertain claims brought on that child's behalf after its birth.
10 6
101. See supra Part IllI(A)(2).
102. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Patti, 114 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1953); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93,
96 (Pa. 1960).
103. See generally Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
a driver owes no duty of care to the yet unconceived child of a female driver with whom he
negligently collides). See also Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981) (denying
recovery by child for harm committed against his mother prior to his conception because he was
not within the immediate zone of danger).
104. The majority of preconception tort cases have involved the daughters and grandchildren
of women who were given the drug DES prior to their pregnancies. See, e.g., Grover v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700-01 (Ohio 1992) (holding that the son of a "DES daughter" was not
a foreseeable plaintiff for recovery in products liability for the administration of a harmful drug
to his grandmother prior to the birth of his mother).
105. See Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981).
106. If the child is not bom alive, other legal issues arise as to whether an action can be
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Even in states which would permit a child to sue for preconception
torts, however, it is unlikely that the child would recover for defects
arising out of the AID procedures. Any action the child could bring
would necessarily be based on a claim for wrongful life. These claims
do not involve situations where a fetus in utero has been injured by the
defendant's conduct and has suffered injury as a result. Instead, the
conception, the creation of the child's life itself, is alleged to be the
"harm." Courts have consistently refused to recognize claims for
wrongful life because of the deep-seated ethical dilemma involved.'17
Few courts have been willing to say that children, no matter how
severely impaired, would have been better off had they never been born.
"One of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life -
whether experienced with or without a major physical handicap - is
more precious than non-life."'
0 8
2. The Mother as Plaintiff 09-The child's mother would have
a better chance of recovering if she brings a products liability claim in
her own right, seeking damages based on a wrongful birth1' theory.
The wrongful birth claim enjoys far greater judicial acceptance than
wrongful life"' because it does not define the wrong as the child
being given life, but rather as the denial of the mother's right to choose
to abort or to never even initiate the pregnancy. "2 Thus, if the
brought on its behalf. The decision is likely to turn on whether or not the fetus ever achieved
viability. Some courts have been willing to treat stillborn full-term children the same in terms of
their capacity to bring suit for wrongful death as children who are born alive but die within a few
seconds. See Johnson v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985). But, if the fetus never achieved
viability, it is unlikely that a tort action could be filed on its behalf in any state. See, e.g.,
Miccolis v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 587 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032
(Kan. 1990); Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990); Hudak v. Georgy, 567 A.2d 1095
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
107. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d
807 (N.Y. 1978). But see Curlender v. Bio-science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App.
1980) (permitting recovery under wrongful life theory by child who was born with Tay-Sachs
disease as a result of negligent genetic testing).
108. Berman, 404 A.2d at 12.
109. See supra note 14.
110. A wrongful birth claim is a claim brought by the parents of a child born
with severe defects against a physician who negligently fails to inform them
... of an increased possibility that the mother will give birth to such a child,
thereby precluding an informed decision as to whether to have the child.
Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
111. A few states have, however, statutorily prohibited both wrongful life and wrongful birth
claims. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(2) (1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305
(1988).
112. A third related type of claim is known as wrongful conception, but this generally applies
when a negligently performed sterilization procedure fails to prevent a pregnancy and where the
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mother can show that she would not have carried the child to term or
that she would not have consented to the insemination if she had known
the truth about the sperm donor's medical history,"' many courts may
award her compensation for wrongful birth."
4
The forms and amounts of damages that courts award for wrongful
birth vary. The most common measure of damages in wrongful birth
cases is the extraordinary medical and educational expenses which the
parents will incur due to the child's mental or physical handicaps. "'
The ordinary costs of the pregnancy and of childrearing are not awarded
by most courts because, unlike wrongful conception cases in which the
parents never intended to bear a child in the first place, wrongful birth
plaintiffs planned to support a child and would have incurred certain
expenses anyway." 6 Emotional distress awards are frequently denied
in wrongful birth cases as well, either because no physical manifestation
of distress is evident," 7 because the joys of having a child are
considered to outweigh any distress due to the defect,"' because the
child is born healthy. See generally Philip Braverman, Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays
for Bringing Up Baby?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 418 (1978).
113. Courts may look with suspicion upon mothers who, in hindsight, assert that they would
have aborted their pregnancies if they had known of any reason to do so, but it is generally
believed that most parents will be able to meet the burden of persuasion on this issue. See Genetic
Counseling, supra note 43, at 1510.
114. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v. Medical Cir.
of Del., 571 A.2d 786 (Del. 1989); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
115. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981) (allowing recovery of extraordinary
medical expenses associated with raising a child with cystic fibrosis when the parents were
deprived of their right to abort the pregnancy by the physician's negligent failure to diagnose the
disease).
116. See Arche v. United States Dept. of the Army, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990). The
underlying rationale for this approach to damage measurement is that the mother's rightful position
in a case involving the negligent misrepresentation that her fetus is free of genetic defects should
be defined according to the position she would have been in had the circumstances been as the
defendant represented them to be - a position in which she would be responsible for the financial
upbringing of a normal child. Michael B. Kelly, The Righ#ful Position in "'Wrongful Life" Actions,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1991).
117. See M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992) (holding an adoption
agency liable for negligently misleading adoptive parents as to a child's genetic and medical
background but refusing to award damages for emotional distress in the absence of a physical
manifestation of such distress). Although the case was founded on misrepresentation rather than
wrongful birth, it is similar to this Comment's hypothetical artificial insemination cases in that the
defendant's wrongful conduct caused the plaintiffs to become the legal parents of a genetically
impaired child without being given the opportunity to avoid their situations by abortion or by
refusing to adopt. But see Branch v. Homefed Bank, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating
that damages for emotional distress are recoverable in cases of negligent misrepresentation when
the plaintiff has sustained other non-economic injuries as a result of the misrepresentation).
118. "The benefit rule requires that any special benefits to the plaintiffs from having a child
should be offset against the damages caused by the defendant's negligence." Arche, 798 P.2d at
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parents did not witness the actual injury to the child," 9 or because the




Even assuming that a plaintiff can establish causation, sperm
donors, physicians, and sperm banks are likely to raise at least one of
several defenses if faced with a prima facie products liability case
against them. These defenses include assumption of the risk, the use of
consent forms and disclaimers, lack of privity, and the state-of-the-art
defense, among others.
A. Assumption of the Risk and Exculpatory Clauses
For assumption of the risk to bar recovery, a plaintiff must
manifest consent to accept that risk, either expressly or implicitly
through conduct. 12' This defense is probably best examined in
conjunction with consent forms and disclaimers, because such
documents often contain exculpatory clauses with language resembling
express assumptions of the risks inherent in artificial insemination.
122
Although these waivers might appear to bar any legal action by a
sperm recipient, they are not effective unless knowingly signed. Also,
some courts require more than a general awareness of danger, rejecting
482. See also Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 493 (Wash. 1993). Although
generally applied against damages for emotional distress, those courts which allow recovery of
ordinary childrearing expenses will often apply the benefit rule to reduce the damage award. See
Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cit. 1983).
119. See, e.g., Arche, 798 P.2d at 482 (stating that the "visibility of results as opposed to
visibility of the tortious act does not give rise to a claim for emotional damages"). But see
Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982) (allowing parents to recover for emotional distress
because their pain was caused directly by the deprivation of their right to abort the fetus,
regardless of whether they "witnessed" the tortious conduct).
120. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977). But see Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979) (allowing recovery for emotional distress despite its inherent valuation
problems because emotional distress is considered just as real an injury as physical harm).
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 496C cmt. h.
122. The sample AID recipient consent form provided in the 1990 AFS GUIDELINES, supra
note 33, at 13S states:
I . .. understand that within the normal human population a certain percentage
(approximately 4%) of children are born with physical or mental defects, and that the
occurrence of such defects is beyond the control of physicians. I therefore understand
that [the practitioner] do[es] not assume any responsibility for the physical or mental
characteristics of any child . . born as a result of artificial insemination . .. I do
hereby absolve, release, indemnify, protect, and hold [the practitioner] harmless from
any and all liability for the mental and physical nature or character of any child ... so
conceived or born ....
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the assumption of the risk defense unless the plaintiff knew of the
specific risk that eventually caused her harm. 23  Arguably, women
who decide to undergo artificial insemination expect that an adequate
amount of genetic testing will be performed, and therefore, they sign the
consent forms. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, such testing is
not always performed, 124 and the risk of genetic defects is higher than
most recipients would probably expect. Presumably, many women
would refuse to consent to the procedure if they had full knowledge of
the inadequacy of the testing that actually takes place. 25  This,
together with the inequality of bargaining power between physicians and
patients, 126  the lack of a suitable alternative to AID, 127 and the
public policy against physicians contracting away liability for their own
negligence,"' would in all likelihood convince a court to disregard
these consent forms as express risk assumptions.
Defendants would have an equally tenuous argument that a
recipient has implicitly assumed the risk of bearing a genetically
123. See Garcia v. City of Tucson, 640 P.2d 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
124. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
125. Where the language of a release "alerted the plaintiff to the dangers inherent in [an
activity] . . . it does not follow that [s]he was aware of, much less intended to accept, any
enhanced exposure to injury occasioned by the carelessness of the very persons on which [s]he
depended for [her] safety." Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 310-11 (N.Y. 1979) (emphasis
added).
126. When two parties have significantly unequal bargaining power, exculpatory clauses
benefitting the party with the bargaining advantage are generally held to be void as against public
policy. See Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311-12 (1990) (striking down
exculpatory clause where "one party must either accept what is offered or be deprived of the
advantages of the relation"); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963).
127. The alternatives to artificial insemination include adoption, in vitro fertilization, and
surrogacy. The rates of contraceptive use and elective abortion have risen over the past several
decades, resulting in a dramatic reduction in the number of adoptable children. ANDREA L.
BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY FROM LABORATORIES TO
LEGISLATURES 24 (1989). Also, adoption is not fully comparable to artificial insemination in that
it involves a child who is not biologically related to either parent. Undoubtedly, many couples
would prefer to raise a child that is genetically linked to at least one of them, if not both. In vitro
fertilization is not a viable option for many couples either, especially if they are seeking artificial
insemination out of fear that a particular trait of the husband will be passed along to his offspring,
since in vitro fertilization uses the husband's semen to fertilize an egg which has been removed
from the mother's body. Surrogacy contracts have obvious disadvantages as well, including the
possibility that the surrogate mother will change her mind or that the contract will be declared
invalid. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. See also BoNNIcKESEN, supra, at 84, 118-
19. In addition, trying to find different AID practitioners to perform the procedure would probably
not be a real option either, since they are all likely to use consent forms containing similar
language.
128. See, e.g., Smith v. Hospital Auth., 287 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Olson v. Molzen,
558 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tenn. 1977); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Ctr., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1968);
Belshaw v. Feinstein, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (Ct. App. 1968).
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impaired child by undergoing artificial insemination. Reproduction, by
its very nature, involves an inherent risk of untoward results, but at least
with sexual reproduction the mother has some opportunity to research
the father's genetic history, so that she may self-screen to some
extent.'29  In artificial insemination, she must rely on others to
conduct this screening process for her. Surely, she has a reasonable
expectation that some degree of testing will be performed. The extent
of testing which can be legitimately expected is debatable, 30 but
given the current state of affairs in this field' 3' it is unlikely that what
is presently being done will meet the recipient's expectations. While
a recipient of donor semen must implicitly assume a certain degree of
risk due to the unpredictability of the human reproductive process, she
does not necessarily assume the risk that the screening and testing
process will fall below her own standards of acceptability.'32
B. Lack of Privity
Although the defense of lack of privity has been heavily eroded in
products liability law, it still enjoys limited application under the
warranty theory.' 33 The Uniform Commercial Code provides three
alternative approaches from which states may choose in determining
who may recover for breach of an implied warranty."' Alternative
A extends the warranty to "any natural person who is in the family or
household of the buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the
goods."'35  Under this approach, the actual donor could use lack of
privity as a defense because even if the donor was considered a
merchant, the recipient is not closely enough related to the entity to
whom the donor sold his sperm. The recipient would, however, be able
to maintain a claim against the party who inseminated her because, in
129. Interestingly, it is because of self-screening that many women seek artificial insemination
by donors in the first place. Curie-Cohen et a., supra note 22, at 585. In a 1979 survey, at least
one-third of physicians who had performed artificial inseminations using donor semen had
inseminated women whose decision to undergo AID was due to a fear of transmitting genetic
conditions which they knew their partners to possess. Id.
130. See supra notes 42-45.
131. See supra Part II.
132. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 68, at 485 (asserting that "it is not true that in any
case where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known danger he necessarily consents to any
future negligence of the defendant.").
133. The status of the privity requirement in warranty actions in each state is summarized in
2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS UABILITY, Ch. 3, at 3-7 to 3-24 (1977).
134. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1993).
135. Id.
98 DICKINsoN LAW REVIEW SPRING 1994
that case, she is the buyer, and the practitioner who inseminated her
would not be able to employ the lack of privity defense.
Alternatives B and C permit recovery by any person whom the
seller could foresee might be affected by the goods.'36 Here, a
recipient could probably recover from either the donor or the
practitioner if they were considered to be merchants, because both know
that the sperm they are selling will ultimately be used to inseminate a
woman in the recipient's position. Therefore, because the recipient is
reasonably expected to "use, consume, or be affected" by the donor's
sperm, the recipient is a foreseeable plaintiff if the sperm is shown to
be defective. In states which have adopted Alternative B or C, then,
lack of privity would not be a valid defense for any of the potential
defendants.
C. State-of-the-Art Defense
Physicians or sperm banks might assert a state-of-the-art defense
in response to a products liability claim, arguing that it was not
technologically feasible for them to discover the defect in the donated
sperm given the leading edge of medical practice at the time. This
defense has never been available under warranty theory and many
courts have followed the Restatement view'1 that strict liability in
tort will attach even when a product defect is undetectable. 13S In the
negligence context, the state-of-the-art defense should be distinguished
from cases in which the technology exists to test products for a
particular defect but it is not customary practice to run such tests. In
the latter situation, the issue becomes whether or not the customary
practice was sufficiently non-negligent that compliance therewith would
satisfy one's duty of care.'39 The state-of-the-art defense is properly
invoked only if there was no technologically feasible way of discovering
the defect in the semen. In these particular cases, the state-of-the-art
defense acts as an absolute bar to negligence. 4
136. Id. The only difference between the second and third alternatives is that Alternative B
extends the warranty to "any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or
be affected by the goods..." while Alternative C contains the same wording except that the word
natural is omitted.
137. According to the RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 402A(2)(a), strict products liability may
attach although "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product."
138. See, e.g., Majdic v. Cincinnati Mach. Co., 537 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988);
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (II1. 1970).
139. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
140. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 875 (Alaska 1979); Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983); Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,
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VI. Recommendations
Conception through artificial insemination by donor has gained
increasing acceptance in the United States over the last several decades,
and it now provides many couples and single women with a viable
alternative to adoption, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy contracts.
Because of the important role which artificial insemination now plays
in our society, we must ensure that it remains both safe and available.
A. Steps Must Be Taken to Eliminate the Potential for Liability for
Non-Negligent Conduct in Artificial Insemination
No matter how extensively sperm donors are screened for
compatibility with recipients, the nature of human reproduction is such
that some children are bound to be bom with genetic defects. 4' If
products liability suits are permitted against artificial insemination
practitioners regardless of fault, the practitioners would become insurers
of the health of the children they help conceive. Ultimately, this would
result in increased costs being passed on to the recipients, effectively
placing AID out of the reach of many prospective mothers.
1. Sperm Donor Liability Should Be Limited in Order to
Encourage Donation.-A man's willingness to donate semen is crucial
to the continued availability of AID as an alternative means of
conception. Therefore, the liability of the sperm donor should be
limited to situations in which he intentionally or recklessly fails to
inform the physician or sperm bank that he carries a genetic defect.
Exposing donors to liability for mere negligence, or especially for strict
liability or warranty liability without any fault, would dissuade many
men from participating in the AID procedure. In turn, this would
eliminate AID as an option altogether or drive the costs of AID so high
that only the wealthy could afford it. Furthermore, it is more practical
to place the burden of detecting genetic defects on the AID practitioner
than on donors who are likely to be unfamiliar with the intricacies of
genetics.
2. Legislative Limits Should Be Placed on AID Practitioner
Liability.-While AID practitioners are more appropriate targets for
liability, society should also limit the availability of products liability
actions against physicians and sperm banks so that the AID procedure
396 N.E.2d 534 (11. 1979).
141. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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remains widely available. At the same time, society should take
proactive measures to improve genetic screening practices and reduce
the chances of undiscovered defects being passed to children. Given
the nature and importance of AID today, it deserves legal treatment
similar to that afforded blood transfusions.
Blood shield statutes should be amended to cover artificial
insemination explicitly, and states that have no such legislation should
take steps to enact similar provisions. So far, the only state that has
dealt with this issue is Georgia, already having passed a law that
protects AID practitioners from liability unless they are negligent.
142
The Georgia approach is sensible because those practitioners who
negligently fail to detect a genetic defect should be held accountable for
the foreseeable consequences of their negligence, but those who fail to
detect a defect that would be technologically or economically
impracticable to discover should not be found similarly responsible.
B. Mandatory National Donor Screening Standards Should Be
Promulgated
To more clearly define whether the failure to test a sperm donor
for a particular genetic trait constitutes negligence, our system needs a
more comprehensive set of standards than those that presently exist.
Also, unlike the two sets of voluntary standards now in place,4 3 the
new standards must be mandatory for all practitioners. This idea is not
without support. In fact, several United States Congressmen have
suggested that uniform regulation of artificial insemination is
necessary. 44  Many medical 45  and legal146  commentators have
made such recommendations as well. Despite any practical problems
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42(b) (1993).
143. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
144. See 37 Cong. Rec. E4145-02 at E4146 (1991) (introducing legislation to develop
mandatory regulations inthe artificial insemination industry by Rep. Ron Wyden of Oregon); 135
Cong. Rec. S396 (1989) (suggestion by Senator Jesse Helms that genetic history and, when
appropriate, genetic screening be required of sperm donors in conjunction with AIDS Control Act).
During his tenure as a United States Senator, Vice President Albert Gore also indicated an intent
to use the federal government's authority to develop a mandatory sperm donor screening system,
suggesting that practitioners get together with government agencies such as the Food and Drug
Administration to establish national standards. Charles Marwick, Artificial Insemination Faces
Regulation, Testing of Donor Semen, Other Measures, 260 JAMA 1339, 1339-40 (1988); Gregory
Byrne, Artificial Insemination Report Prompts Call for Regulation, 241 SCIENCE 895 (1988).
145. See Mascola & Guinan, The Saga Unfolds, supra note 11.
146. See Kathleen M. Peterson, Comment, Federal Regulation of Artificial Insemination Donor
Screening Practices: An Opportunity for Law to Co-Evolve with Medicine, 96 DICK. L. REV. 59
(1991); L. Thomas Styron, Comment, Artificial Insemination: A New Frontier for Medical
Malpractice and Medical Products Liability, 32 LOY. L. REv. 411, 445 (1986).
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inherent in promulgating a comprehensive system of standards, 147 we
must at least establish a minimum acceptable standard of care in donor
screening that exceeds the level of care currently being provided by
some AID practitioners. Not only will these standards help physicians
(and, if necessary, the courts) determine what should be done when
screening donors, promulgating such provisions will ultimately reduce
the risks of conceiving genetically impaired children through artificial
insemination.
VII. Conclusion
Artificial insemination by donor is clearly an area in need of legal
oversight. Self-regulation has become dangerously lax. Further, under
the current state of the law, if a child is born with genetic defects, there
is a substantial likelihood that any of the three products liability theories
might succeed against some, if not all, of the potential defendants. To
preserve the option of artificial insemination and to protect the health
and welfare of the children the procedure is aimed at conceiving, the
availability of legal action should be restricted in concurrence with a
promulgation of mandatory national donor screening standards.
Megan D. Mclntyre
147. Each human genome consists of at least 30,000 structural genes, approximately three to
five of which are lethal recessive genes capable of causing genetic defects. See Newton E. Morton
et al., An Estimate of Mutational Damage in Man from Data on Consanguineous Marriages, 42
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. So. 855 (1956). Since testing all semen donors for all 2,000 medically
recognized genetic diseases N~ould be thoroughly impracticable, Peterson, supra note 146, at 90,
any guidelines would necessarily have to leave room for practitioners' professional judgment when
it comes to screening for the rarer conditions.

